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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional servitudes doctrine requires that covenant burdens
and benefits touch and concern the land if they are to pass automati-
cally to successors of the original covenanting parties. The doctrine,
which dates back to 1583,1 applies regardless of the parties' intent,
limiting the kinds of covenants that can be made into servitudes.
There is something intuitively appealing about the touch and con-
cern doctrine of traditional servitudes law: limiting covenants that
can run with the land to those that relate to the land-that touch or
© Copyright held by Susan F. French.
Professor of Law, UCLA Law School; Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of
Property, Servitudes.
1. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (KB. 1583). For a brief description of the
case and the subsequent development of servitudes law, see JEssE DUXEMSNER &
JAMES E. KRIR, PROPERTY 857-90 (4th ed. 1998).
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concern the land "in a substantial degree"2-seems to make sense. If
they don't relate to land, why should they bind successors to the land
who have not assumed the obligations? This intuitive sense, coupled
with the euphonious character of the phrase, probably accounts for its
persistence in our law. Nearly every case involving covenants con-
tains a recital of requirements for creating a running covenant that
includes intent, privity, and touch and concern.
Despite its widespread and persistent use, the new Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes has abandoned the touch and concern
doctrine. Why?
Despite its seeming simplicity, the touch and concern doctrine has
proved hard to apply, particularly with respect to covenants to pay
money or to perform acts on land other than the burdened land. Many
pages of scholarly journals have been filled with attempts to explain
and rationalize the touch and concern requirement.3 In recent years,
particularly beginning in 1982, the doctrine has been subjected to
wholesale attack. From one side, Richard Epstein attacked the doc-
trine on the ground that it allowed courts to interfere with freedom of
contract. 4 From the other side, I attacked the doctrine on the ground
that it was too vague, too difficult to understand, too easily manipu-
lated, too easily used to mask analysis, and prone to lead courts and
lawyers into error by failing to focus their attention on the real issues.
Despite a spirited defense of the doctrine by Jeffrey Stake,5 my posi-
tion prevailed in the new Restatement, which has replaced the doc-
trine with a number of other rules and doctrines designed to fulfill
many of the functions that have been ascribed to the traditional touch
and concern doctrine.
It is not my purpose here to rehash the arguments for and against
retention of the traditional touch and concern doctrine in the new Re-
statement. 6 Suffice it to say that all aspects that recent commentators
2. This phrase appears in the famous case, Neponsit Property Owners'Association v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1938), the case that
led the way to widespread enforceability of covenants to pay assessments to prop-
erty owner associations for maintenance of community facilities.
3. The first Restatement of Property restated the doctrine as requiring that per-
formance of the covenant operate to benefit the physical use or enjoyment of land
possessed by some party to the covenant. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537
(1944). This requirement applied only to enforcement of covenants at law, not to
equitable enforcement. See id. § 539.
4. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1353 (1982).
5. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern,
1988 DuKE L.J. 925.
6. Some have advocated discarding touch and concern. See Epstein, supra note 4,
(arguing that the only need for judicial regulation of servitudes is to provide no-
tice by recordation of the privately created interests); Susan F. French, Toward a
Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv.
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found valuable about the traditional doctrine, save two,7 have been
1261, 1289-92, 1305 (1982)(arguing that improved termination doctrines should
replace restrictive creation doctrines; if the agreement to create the servitude is
valid, the law should give effect to the parties' intent, enforcing the agreement
until it becomes obsolete or unduly burdensome). Others have defended the doc-
trine. See Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes,
73 CoRsNxu L. REv. 883, 890-98 (1988)(arguing that requirement protects subse-
quent purchasers against foolish decisions and prevents promisors and others
from behaving opportunistically); Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servi-
tudes, 7 J. LEGAL SUD. 139, 150-161 (1978)(arguing that the doctrine helps avoid
inefficiency); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1179, 1233 (1982)(arguing that somewhat unusual interventionist theory
is justified because permanent attachment to land of merely personal obligations
is likely to frustrate objectives of private land holding system; doctrine eliminates
possibility of creating modem versions of feudal serfdom); Stewart E. Sterk, Free-
dom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70
IOWA L. REv. 615, 661 (1985)("However quaint in formulation and muddled in
application, the touch and concern requirement... has at least some potential to
serve as a modest check against externalities, inadequate foresight, and in-
tergenerational imposition.").
7. Professor Jeffrey E. Stake, supra note 5, in his defense of retaining the tradi-
tional touch or concern doctrine, argues that it is used by courts to achieve an
efficient allocation of the burdens and benefits of covenants among original par-
ties and successors. He argues that courts properly allow burdens or benefits to
run to successors only in situations where economic inefficiency is thereby
avoided. In his view, the courts appropriately deprive people of the power to cre-
ate running burdens or benefits unless inefficiency would thereby be avoided.
Although I believe that the question whether the original party, or the succes-
sor, can more efficiently perform the burden, or more efficiently receives the bene-
fit, is appropriately taken into consideration in determining what the parties
probably intended, I do not believe that courts should substitute their judgment
as to efficiency for arrangements that the parties freely arrived at based on their
judgment as to what served their best interests. Only if the arrangement is so
inefficient, or so unfair, that it would be against public policy to enforce it, should
courts refuse to permit the creation of the servitude. See RESTATEhmEN (THImD)
OF PROPERT. SERvrrUDES § 3.1 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1998).
Stake's other argument, which was rejected, is that the touch and concern
rubric itself should be retained, rather than replaced by a more direct test aimed
at the reasons why courts might justifiably refuse to carry out the intent of the
parties. He argues that judges intuitively reach efficient results, but that if ex-
plicitly directed to do so, they would find it more difficult to do so. He argues that
an explicit efficiency-in-allocation test might lead to less efficient results because
courts might overlook subtle inefficiencies, and lawyers unsophisticated in eco-
nomic analysis might argue false economies or ignore important efficiencies that
they are unable to articulate in economic jargon. In other words, lawyers and
judges will intuitively do a better job of producing efficient results if asked
whether a covenant touches or concerns land than they will if explicitly asked to
determine whether placing the benefit or burden on the successor would avoid
inefficiency. See Stake, supra, note 5, at 933-74.
The Restatement takes the position that judges and lawyers will do a better
job if directly asked the question why a particular servitude arrangement agreed
to by the parties should not be enforced, rather than asked whether it touches or
concerns the land. This new formulation probably avoids the problem foreseen by
Stake in that it uses terms familiar to lawyers and judges. Rather than using
19981
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retained in the new Restatement. Instead my purpose is, first, to pay
tribute to Lawrence Berger's contribution to our current understand-
ing of the touch and concern doctrine, and then to provide a road map
to the new Restatement's incorporation of the functions previously at-
tributed to the touch and concern doctrine.
II. A TRIBUTE TO LAWRENCE BERGER
Professor Rabin aptly described the law of real covenants and equi-
table servitudes when I first encountered it:
[T]he law in this area [real covenants and equitable servitudes] is an un-
speakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who ventures into this formidable wil-
derness never emerges unscarred. Some, the smarter ones, quickly turn back
to take up something easier like the income taxation of trusts and estates.
Others, having lost their way, plunge on and after weeks of effort emerge not
far from where they began, clearly the worse for wear. On looking back they
see the trail they thought they broke obscured with foul smelling waters and
noxious weeds. Few willingly take up the challenge again.8
The first time that I had to teach running real covenants and equi-
table servitudes was a nightmare.9 The materials I had to work with
were two lists of requirements, one for covenants to run at law, the
other for equitable servitudes. I also had some cases that didn't seem
to make any sense. In fact, the lists didn't make much sense either.
The lists looked like this:
Covenants at law: Equitable Servitudes:
Intent Intent
Writing Notice
Horizontal Privity
Lease (England)
Easement (Mass.)
Deed (elsewhere)
Touch or Concern Touch or Concern (maybe)
Benefits in gross?? No benefits in gross
No affirmative burdens
Vertical Privity Vertical Privity
Strict (burden) None (burden)
Relaxed (benefit) Relaxed (benefit)
economic jargon, Section 3.1, allows courts to refuse enforcement to arrange-
ments as servitudes if persuaded that the arrangement would violate public pol-
icy. Although not limiting possible grounds for public policy violations, Sections
3.4 through 3.7 channel that discussion into questions whether the proposed ar-
rangement would be an unreasonable restraint on alienation or on trade, or
whether it would be unconscionable. These are all terms familiar to judges and
lawyers, and arguably, at least, leave as much room for intuitive understandings
as the old touch or concern rubric.
8. EDWARD RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 489 (1974).
9. Not only was I new to the material-I don't remember meeting real covenants in
law school-but I was the only Property teacher in the building that year. Both
my property colleagues were on leave. It was really a nightmare!
[Vol. 77:653
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The lists started out pretty straightforward, but got more and more
complicated. The lists finally turned into charts as I tried to fight
through the questions whether appurtenant and touch and concern
meant the same thing, whether benefits in gross were allowed for real
covenants and easements, but not for equitable servitudes, whether
adverse possessors were bound on equitable servitudes, but not on
real covenants, whether the statute of frauds really did not apply to
equitable servitudes and notice really wasn't required for real
covenants. Not only did the commentators and jurisdictions go all
over the place, but nothing explained why these things mattered.
I was particularly puzzled by the horizontal privity and touch and
concern requirements. Why covenants between neighbors could only
be enforced by injunction, but covenants imposed by a grantor on a
grantee could be enforced by a judgment for damages, made no
sense.10 Although I was initially attracted to the touch and concern
doctrine by its euphony and an intuitive affinity for the idea that
benefits and burdens that did not touch or concern the land should not
run with it, the cases really puzzled me.
For example, in.Neponsit Property Owners'Association v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank,"i the highest court in New York struggled
mightily to find that a homeowners association could enforce a
covenant to pay assessments for upkeep of the privately owned roads,
parks, beaches, and sewers serving the development. Why on earth
shouldn't such covenants bind successors? Was there some reason
developers should not be able to set up communities with privately
owned and supported infrastructure? And if they were allowable, why
shouldn't the property owners association be the logical entity to
collect the assessments and manage the common facilities? The
court's discussion of whether the covenants touched and concerned the
land did not seem to have anything to do with reality. Another
baffling point about the case was why the assessment covenants could
not be enforced at law. For relatively small amounts of money, that
would surely be as sensible as foreclosing a lien.
I could not make heads or tails out of the material on horizontal
privity or touch and concern, or the variations in when interests in
gross could be created. Most of the books and articles I turned to
didn't help. Privity and touch and concern were incantations solemnly
invoked and magically applied by courts, often with inconsistent and
unpredictable results. Scholars engaged in mystical contemplation of
the sacred terms, but their reading of the deep meanings didn't
explain why anyone should care whether an obligation touched or
10. In fact, it didn't make any sense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 2.4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1989)(providing that horizontal privity
is not required).
11. 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
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concerned or whether the original parties were just neighbors, rather
than buyers and sellers of land. Even the explanations of what it
means to touch and concern were circular. Something touches and
concerns if it alters the legal relations of a landowner. Right! If an
obligation runs to a successor, it will alter the legal relations; if it
doesn't run, it won't. So, how do they decide whether it will or not?
This stuff was ridiculous!
I finally decided that, despite the lists, the statute of frauds
probably did apply to equitable servitudes, as well as to real
covenants, and that the recording acts did apply to real covenants, as
well as to equitable servitudes. But for the rest, I finally resorted to
telling the students that it didn't seem to make much sense, but they
"just had to learn it." I really dreaded having to come back to this
subject another year.
Then I found Professor Lawrence Berger's pioneering article, A
Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land.12 It was a
breath of fresh air. He actually looked at the privity and touch and
concern doctrines in operation and found that touch and concern and
vertical privity served a real world, important function. What he
figured out was that, properly applied, these doctrines free subsequent
purchasers from obligations a normal purchaser would not expect to
run with the land, regardless of boilerplate in the documents stating
that all obligations are intended to run with the land. Professor
Berger's work gave me hope that maybe there was some sense in all
the tangled mess of servitudes law after all. His article inspired me to
return to the subject to try to figure it all out. The result of several
years of hard work was my 1982 article, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes, Reweaving the Ancient Strands,i 3 in which I identified the
functions of all the traditional servitudes doctrines. The article
recommended discarding those that no longer served needed functions
and retaining the others, or their functions, in a modernized law of
servitudes that would be easier to understand and use. That article in
turn led to my appointment as the Reporter for the Restatement of the
Law of Property (Third): Servitudes. That project, the last part of
which was adopted by the American Law Institute in May, 1998, is
currently in the final stages of editing, and should appear in print in
2000.
Without the inspiration of Professor Berger's article, I might well
have taken up income taxation of trusts and estates! As it is, I'm not
sure that I haven't emerged the worse for wear, but I am sure that no
one teaching in this area today should ever have to say "it doesn't
make much sense; you'll just have to learn it." With the new
12. 55 MiNN. L. REv. 167 (1970).
13. 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1982).
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Restatement as a tool, I am hopeful that we can soon come to the point
where our coverage of servitude creation focuses on the policy choices
involved in determinations whether developers, individual grantors,
and neighbors should or should not be able to use servitudes to
implement various kinds of arrangements whether they involve land
uses, financing infrastructure, creating communities of particular
character, or other purposes. The tensions between the values of
freedom of contract and society's interests in maintaining utility of
land resources and a healthy democracy will provide much more
interesting material for class discussion, and better training for future
lawyers and judges, than the old struggles with privity and touch and
concern. All of us who work in this area owe a big thanks to Professor
Berger!
HI. ROAD MAP TO A DISAGGREGATED TOUCH AND
CONCERN DOCTRINE IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
The touch and concern doctrine operated primarily to limit crea-
tion of affirmative covenants that involved anything other than physi-
cal activity on the covenantor's own land, and to prevent the creation
of benefits in gross. Although it theoretically operated at the point of
transfer of the burdened land, in fact it was sometimes invoked long
after a successor had come into possession of the burdened land, and
provided an opportunity for termination of an obsolete arrangement.
The flexibility of the doctrine, due primarily to the vagueness of its
content, allowed courts to use it to stop covenants thought to pose un-
necessary risks of depressing land values or of unfairly burdening suc-
cessors who would not have expected to become liable on the covenant.
These functions will be addressed under the headings of protecting
land values, protecting purchasers from surprises, and modification
and termination of servitude arrangements.
First, a preliminary word on the scope and organization of the new
Restatement. This Restatement does not cover Landlord-Tenant Law,
which is the subject of another Restatement. The only covenants ad-
dressed here are covenants between owners of different parcels of
land, or covenants between a landowner and another whose interest is
in gross. In addition, this Restatement excludes mortgages and simi-
lar real property security devices, which are also the subject of an-
other Restatement, and, to the extent they present different
considerations from other covenants, this Restatement excludes servi-
tudes used in connection with oil and gas and other natural resource
extractive activities.
The subject of the Restatement is servitudes, which includes ease-
ments, profits, and covenants. The Restatement has adopted a unified
approach to servitudes law, applying the same rules to all servitudes,
except where special characteristics of a particular servitude call for
1998]
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application of a different rule. Chapter One sets forth the scope of the
Restatement's coverage and defines servitudes. 14 The number of ser-
vitude categories has been substantially reduced by merging irrevoca-
ble licenses into easements and negative easements and equitable
servitudes into covenants.
Chapter Two sets forth requirements for and various methods of
creating servitudes. The only requirements for creating an express
voluntary servitude are intent to create an interest that runs with an
interest in land,15 and compliance with the statute of frauds. 16 A ser-
vitude that is effectively created under Chapter Two is valid unless it
is illegal or against public policy under Chapter Three.17 Chapter
Four sets forth rules for interpretation of servitudes.18 Chapter Five
covers succession to servitudes, setting forth rules to determine how
servitude interests are transferred to successors. 19 This chapter also
sets forth rules for allocating benefits and burdens when estates af-
fected by servitudes are split into present and future interests, subdi-
vided, adversely possessed, or transferred as the result of a foreclosure
sale.2O
Chapter Six deals with servitudes used to create and govern com-
mon interest communities. 21 Chapter Seven covers modification and
termination of servitudes 22 and Chapter Eight, the final chapter, cov-
ers enforcement of servitudes. 23 Standing, remedies, and defenses are
the principal subjects of Chapter Eight.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 1.1-1.5 (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1998).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.2 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1989).
16. See id. § 2.8. This is not the only way to create a servitude, of course. Implied
servitudes based on prior use, references to maps and boundaries, general plans,
and necessity, and servitudes created by prescription are all recognized. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.11-2.15 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.16-2.17 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1993). In addition, exceptions may be made to the statute of frauds,
and servitudes may be created by estoppel. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP-
ERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.9-2.10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1989).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 3.1-3.7 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (Tentative
Draft No. 7, 1998).
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 4.1-4.13 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1994).
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 5.1-5.9 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1995).
20. See id. §§ 5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 6.1-6.21 (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1998).
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 7.1-7.15 (Tentative Draft
No. 6, 1997).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 8.1-8.5 (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1998).
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People who are interested in problems that might have been
caused by or addressed by the old touch and concern doctrine may find
provisions in Chapters Two, Three, Four, Six, and Seven of interest.
A. Protecting Land Values
The touch and concern doctrine allows courts to protect land re-
sources from the attachment of affirmative burdens that pose a sub-
stantial risk of depressing land values by preventing desirable
redevelopment or by imposing financial burdens that reduce its mar-
ketability. Provisions in the Restatement that permit courts to afford
similar protection are found in Chapter Three which permits invalida-
tion of servitude arrangements that violate public policy.2 4 The basic
rule is set forth in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides that the touch or
concern doctrine has been superseded by the general rule of Section
3.1 and the more specific rules set forth in Sections 3.4 through 3.7.
Those rules cover servitudes that are unreasonable restraints on
alienation2 5 unreasonable restraints on trade or competition 2 6 and
unconscionable servitudes.2 7 It should be noted that these rules are
broader than the old touch and concern doctrine in that they apply to
negative burdens, as well as affirmative ones, but they are also nar-
rower in that they require a finding that the servitude arrangement
actually poses such a substantial risk that to allow the arrangement
would violate public policy. These rules invite, if not require, an ex-
planation of the real reasons why a court is justified in interfering
with the parties' freedom of contract.
Another way in which the touch and concern doctrine protected
land from burdens that would prevent desirable redevelopment was
by prohibiting benefits in gross. Benefits in gross may be more diffi-
cult to remove or renegotiate because of the potential problems in lo-
cating benefit holders since they cannot be identified by ownership of a
particular parcel of land. However, benefits in gross are also very use-
ful and the old blanket prohibition proved costly. The Restatement
solves the problem by authorizing the creation of benefits in gross 28
but providing a special rule for termination. Section 7.12, Modifica-
tion and Termination of a Servitude Held in Gross, provides:
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 3.1-3.7 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1991); RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (Tentative
Draft No. 7, 1998).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 3.4-3.5 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1991).
26. See id. § 3.6.
27. See id. § 3.7.
28. See RESTATErMEN (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.6 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1989). Section 4.6 also liberalizes the old rules on benefits in gross by providing
that they are freely transferable unless the parties intended otherwise. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.6 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1994).
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
If it has become impossible or impracticable to locate the beneficiaries of a
servitude held in gross, a court may modify or terminate the servitude with
the consent of those beneficiaries who can be located, subject to suitable provi-
sions for protection of the interests of those who have not been located.
2 9
B. Protecting Purchasers From Surprises
The touch and concern doctrine's function of protecting purchasers
from nasty surprises by limiting running benefits and burdens to
those that an ordinary purchaser would expect to run, so importantly
identified by Professor Berger,3 O is addressed by two provisions in the
Restatement. Section 4.5 provides rules for determining whether ser-
vitude benefits and burdens are appurtenant, in gross, or personal
(meaning non-transferable). 31 Under that section, a benefit is:
(a) appurtenant to an interest in property if it serves a purpose that would
be more useful to a successor to a property interest held by the original benefi-
ciary of the servitude at the time the servitude was created than it would be to
the original beneficiary after transfer of that interest to a successor;
3 2
(b) in gross if created in a person who held no property that benefited from
the servitude, or if it serves a purpose that would be more useful to the origi-
nal beneficiary than it would be to a successor to an interest in property held
by the original beneficiary at the time the servitude was created;
3 3
(c) personal if not transferable under the rule stated in §4.6(2).34
The Restatement also differentiates between appurtenant, in
gross, and personal burdens.
The burden of a servitude is:
(a) appurtenant if it could be performed more efficiently by a successor to a
property interest held by the original obligor at the time the servitude was
created than by the original obligor after having transferred that interest to a
successor;
3 5
(b) in gross if undertaken by an obligor who held no property that could be
burdened by the servitude, or if it could be performed more efficiently by the
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.12 (Tentative Draft No. 6,
1997).
30. See supra text accompanying note 12.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.5 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998)("Appurtenant, In Gross, and Personal Defined."). This section also goes
part way to fulfill the function ascribed to the touch and concern doctrine by Pro-
fessor Stake, supra note 5, by allocating benefits and burdens along lines similar
to his efficient allocation test. The only difference is that under the Restatement,
the parties would be able to create a different allocation if they manifested their
intent clearly enough and did not run afoul of the rule invalidating unreasonable
restraints on alienation, or otherwise create an arrangement that would be held
to violate public policy.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.5(1)(a) (Tentative Draft No.
4, 1994).
33. Id. § 4.5(1)(b).
34. Id. § 4.5(1)(c).
35. Id. § 4.5(2)(a).
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original obligor than by a successor to a property interest held by the original
obligor at the time the servitude was created;
3 6
(c) personal if the obligation is not delegable under the rule stated in§4.7(1). 3 7
The rules in Section 4.5 are default rules, rather than mandatory
rules, and will yield to a contrary intent of the parties. However, to
bind successors to burdens or benefits that would not ordinarily be
expected to run, the intent of the parties should be clearly and unmis-
takably expressed so that a purchaser who checked the records could
not legitimately claim unfair surprise.
The other provision which will protect purchasers from nasty sur-
prises is Section 7.13, Extinguishment of Servitude Benefits Under
Recording Act. That provision extends greater protection to subse-
quent purchasers than the old touch and concern doctrine by making
it clear that the benefits of servitudes created by prescription, implica-
tion, estoppel and oral grant are subject to extinguishment if
unrecorded.38
C. Modification and Termination of Obsolete Servitudes
Because litigation does not arise until one of the parties to a servi-
tude wants out of the arrangement, the question whether it is not en-
forceable because some part of the arrangement did not touch and
concern land may not arise until it has been observed for a considera-
ble period of time. In Eagle Enterprises v. Gross,3 9 the New York
Court of Appeals held that the burden of a covenant created 30 years
earlier to take and pay for water to be supplied to the covenantor's
land did not touch and concern the land, and therefore did not bind
successors. The decision seems to have been the result of obsolescence
or changed conditions 4O rather than a view that developers should not
be allowed to create private water utilities financed by the lots in the
development the water supply serves (the logical extension of a find-
ing that the burden did not touch and concern).
Several provisions in the Restatement address modification and
termination of servitudes. Section 7.11 provides special rules for mod-
36. Id. § 4.5(2)(b).
37. Id. § 4.5(2)(c).
38. Exceptions are provided for servitudes providing necessary access and utilities,
and servitudes that would be discovered by reasonable inspection or inquiry. See
RESTATEMrENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERvrTDES § 7.13(2)-(3) (Tentative Draft
No. 6, 1997).
39. 349 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1976).
40. The water supply was created for a summer home development and was provided
only from May 1 to October 1. The landowner who wanted out of the covenant
had converted his house to a year-round dwelling and had dug his own well. The
court found that withdrawal of this owner would not jeopardize the ability of the
remaining owners' payments to support the water system.
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ification or termination of certain affirmative covenants.4 ' Subsection
one allows termination, after a reasonable time, of covenants that re-
quire payments indefinitely for consideration received in the past (for
example, a 1% transfer fee imposed by the grantor on all future sales
of the property).42 Under subsection two, covenants that require pay-
ment for services to the burdened estate may be modified or termi-
nated if the obligation becomes excessive in relation to the cost of
providing the services or to the value received by the burdened es-
tate.43 Under subsection two, any modification based on a decrease in
value to the burdened estate should take account of any investment
made by the covenantee in reasonable reliance on continued validity
of the covenant obligation.44 The subsection does not apply if the ser-
vient owner is only required to pay for services used and if alternative
sources of supply are available.45 Subsection two would directly allow
termination of a covenant in a case like Eagle Enterprises v. Gross.
The termination and modification rules of Section 7.11 do not apply
to obligations to a community association covered under Chapter Six,
or to reciprocal obligations imposed pursuant to a common plan of de-
velopment which is not a common interest community. 46 Thus, the
ability of communities like Neponsit to continue to rely on all lots in
the community to pay to support and maintain common facilities is
not jeopardized, while arrangements that benefit outsiders can be
modified and terminated. There are two reasons for the exemption.
First, in common interest communities and general plan develop-
ments, control rests with the property owners, whose interests should
all be affected by the amount of the required payments. The problem
with covenants to make perpetual payments to outsiders is that out-
siders have little or no incentive to bargain or to continue to provide
value in return for payments made. Situations in which landowners
are required to continue payments at fixed rates, even if the cost of
providing service declines, or when landowners are required to pay
increasing rates set without reference to increasing costs of providing
the service exemplify this problem.
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.11 (Tentative Draft No.
6, 1997).
42. See id. § 7.11(1). Such an obligation might be invalid as an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation, if lacking any rational justification under Section 3.5, or
possibly as unconscionable. If not invalid under Section 3, however, it would be
terminable after a reasonable time under this section.
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.11(2) (Tentative Draft
No. 6, 1997).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.11(3) (Tentative Draft
No. 6, 1997).
[Vol. 77:653
TOUCH & CONCERN DOCTRINE
The other reason for exempting common interest communities is
that a variety of controls over burdens that may reduce land values or
operate unfairly are available under Chapter Six.47 Under Sections
6.16 to 6.18, common interest communities are democratically gov-
erned by the property owners. Decisions about desired facilities and
services and levels of assessments and expenditures are made by the
people who have to pay for them. The community association and the
governing board have duties, spelled out in Sections 6.13 and 6.14, to
treat members fairly and to act reasonably in exercising discretionary
powers. Under Section 6.5(2), fees charged for services or use of com-
mon property must be "reasonably related to the costs of providing"
the service or maintaining the common property or the value of the
use or service, unless expressly provided to the contrary in the decla-
ration. Under Section 6.10, property owners enjoy powers to amend
the declaration to change covenant obligations. However, the declara-
tion may not be amended to change the basis for allocating voting
rights or assessments among the property owners or to prohibit or ma-
terially restrict permitted uses of individually owned property. In ad-
dition, Section 6.12 provides for a judicial power to excuse compliance
with requirements of the governing documents where the provision
unreasonably interferes with carrying out the functions of the com-
mon interest community and compliance is not necessary to protect
legitimate interests of property owners or lenders holding security in-
terests in property. There are also provisions in Sections 6.19 to 6.21
requiring developers to create and turn over control of common prop-
erty to a property owners association and protecting the rights of pur-
chasers from overreaching by the developer.
Finally, the changed conditions doctrine is set forth in Section 7.10,
which provides:
When a change has taken place since the creation of a servitude that makes it
impossible as a practical matter to accomplish the purpose for which the servi-
tude was created, a court may modify the servitude to permit the purpose to
be accomplished. If modification is not practicable, a court may terminate the
servitude. 4
8
If the purpose of a servitude can be accomplished, but because of
changed conditions the servient estate is no longer suitable for any
use permitted by the servitude, a court may modify the servitude to
permit other uses under conditions designed to preserve the benefits
of the original servitude. Conservation and preservation servitudes
are not subject to termination under this section.49
47. See RESTATE iENT (THmD) OF PROPERTY: SERvrrUDES ch. 6, Common Interest
Communities (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1988).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6,
1997).
49. See id. Conservation and preservation servitudes held by governmental bodies
and conservation organizations are subject to special rules on enforcement under
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IV. CONCLUSION
The touch and concern doctrine was capable of being used to pro-
tect against some land burdens that might threaten land values or
unfairly surprise land purchasers, and against arrangements that be-
came obsolete. The protection it offered, however, was somewhat er-
ratic, and created obstacles to development of highly useful
servitudes, like covenants to pay assessments to common interest
community associations and conservation servitudes. In addition, the
doctrine exacted a high cost in confusion and complexity, in part by
allowing judges to invalidate covenants without explaining what was
actually wrong with the particular transaction or arrangement.
The new Restatement places far more emphasis on carrying out
the intent of the parties than the old touch and concern doctrine, but
has retained the capacity of the judiciary to intervene to prevent servi-
tudes from unduly depressing land values, to prevent unfair surprises
to subsequent purchasers, and to terminate obsolete payment ar-
rangements. When judges do intervene to modify or terminate bar-
gained-for servitude arrangements, the Restatement rules are
designed to encourage forthright discussion of the grounds for inter-
vention, which should lead to a law of servitudes that is more consis-
tent and predictable and easier to understand.
§ 8.5 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1988) and a new or renumbered section in Chapter 7
that will be included in the final version of the Restatement.
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